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Financial development and economic growth are clearly related, yet the 
institutional channels and even the direction of causality remain unresolved 
theoretical issues.  None the less, and despite the persistence of a wide range of 
organizational forms in advanced economies, strong causality from particular 
forms of organization of financial institutions towards rapid economic growth has 
become a central axiom of orthodox development economics, recently 
strengthened by the empirical findings of ‘new institutional’ economists. This 
chapter argues that this canonical literature is deeply flawed both 
methodologically and empirically. Further, the observed consequences of 
financial liberalisation for savings and investment on the one hand, and for 
macroeconomic stability on the other, suggest that an alternative interpretation of 
the relationship between finance and growth in developing countries is more 
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Introduction 
Financial development and economic growth are clearly closely related, and this 
relationship has occupied the minds of seminal economists from Smith to Schumpeter, 
although the channels and even the direction of causality have remained unresolved in 
both theory and empirics. Long-term sustainable economic growth depends on the ability 
to raise the rates of accumulation of physical and human capital, to use the resulting 
productive assets more efficiently, and to ensure the access of the whole population to 
these assets. Financial intermediation supports this investment process by mobilizing 
household and foreign savings for investment by firms; ensuring that these funds are 
allocated to the most productive use; and spreading risk and providing liquidity so that 
firms can operate the new capacity efficiently.   
 
Unsurprisingly, this ‘structural’ approach to finance, rooted in the classical and 
Keynesian tradition, is that  of Ajit Singh´s critical work on the role of stock markets in 
developing countries, a logical extension of his better known work on developed country 
markets (Singh 1998). Dominant economic reform strategies are designed for developing 
countries without due consideration of their financial systems, or indeed of those of the 
developed countries (which are the explicit benchmark) either. Alternative financial 
development strategies are probably superior, but do not enjoy the benefit of orthodoxy 
(Singh, 2003).  
 
Financial development involves the establishment and expansion of institutions, 
instruments and markets that support this investment and growth process. Historically, 
the role of banks and non-bank financial intermediaries ranging from pension funds to 
stock markets, has been to translate household savings into enterprise investment, 
monitor investments and allocate funds, and to price and spread risk. Financial 
intermediation thus has strong externalities in this context, which are generally positive 
(such as information and liquidity provision), but can also be negative – particularly the 
systemic financial crises which are endemic to market systems as Ajit has recently 
pointed out so clearly (2007). Moreover, the wide range of organizational forms involved 
precluded any clear conclusion as to what kind of financial institutions might maximize 
economic growth.  
 
None the less, as this paper shows, recent attempts by the ‘new institutional 
economists’ to identify ‘advanced´ (i.e. US) financial structures as a key source of  
economic progress seem to have created a new epistemic paradigm, strengthened by 
apparent support from empirical cross-country studies of the relationship between 
indicators of financial development and observed rates of growth. The core argument is 
neatly summarized by Table 1, from which two key conclusions are commonly drawn. 
First, that greater financial depth (that is, higher ratios of total financial assets to national 
income or output) is related to higher levels of productivity and thus income per capita. 
Second, that higher incomes are also associated with a more advanced financial structure, 
that is: the move from banks towards non-bank financial intermediaries, and from both of 
these towards stock markets. The causality is assumed to run from financial development 
to economic growth: so that financial sector reforms, which lead to greater depth and 
improved structure are held to stimulate faster growth. 




Table 1. Financial Development by Income Group, 1990s  
(asset capitalization as percent of GDP) 
 Banks  NBFIs  Stock 
markets 
Total 
High income countries  81  41  33  155 
Upper middle income 
countries 
40 21  11  72 
Lower middle income 
countries 
34 12  12  58 
Low income countries  23  5  4  32 
Source: World Bank (2001) 
 
The dismantling of the traditional development finance model (based on bank-
based systems, directed credit, public development banks, closed capital accounts, capped 
interest rates, and active monetary intervention) that had been established in developing 
countries in the post-War decades has become a core element of the economic reform and 
structural adjustment process led by the international financial institutions. The new 
standard model of financial architecture is held to reflect the imperatives of ‘financial 
development’ as revealed by the success of financial liberalization in the advanced 
economies which moved away from national bank-based systems towards open capital 
markets. These reforms are expected to raise savings and investment levels, increase the 
rate of growth and reduce macroeconomic instability. However, it is far from clear that 
these objectives have been achieved. Most obviously, the series of financial crises that 
have erupted since the mid-1990s calls into question the appropriateness of financial 
liberalisation and opening for fragile economies at early stages of industrialisation; but 
also the decline of funding for large firms in productive sectors, and SMEs in general, is a 
major problem and is probably even more significant for sustainable growth and poverty 
reduction in the long run (Singh, 2001).  
 
This chapter has the following structure. The next section examines the relationship 
between financial development and economic growth, which underpins the ‘new standard 
model’ of financial reform in developing countries. The growing empirical evidence 
suggests that this relationship is not so close or as unidirectional as is usually supposed, 
and does not provide a sound evidential basis for the prescriptions of the new standard 
model. I then turn to two central issues in more detail: the effect of financial reform on 
savings and corporate funding on the one hand; and the consequences for macroeconomic 
stability and investment on the other. The final section concludes with the implications of 
the analysis presented in this chapter for both policy design in developing countries and 
our understanding of how economic ideas are spread and embedded.  
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Theory versus Evidence on Financial Development and Economic Growth 
The extremely influential study by King and Levine (1993a), and subsequent 
work by Levine and Zervos (1998), Levine (2000), and Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000), 
have all appeared to provide sound empirical evidence in support of the new standard 
model.
2 Levine (2000) further shows that the impact of financial development on growth 
acts mainly through total factor productivity rather than through capital accumulation or 
savings rates. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2004) even claim to show that financial 
development reduces income inequality and absolute poverty levels. A universal elixir. 
 
In their canonical paper, King & Levine (1993a) regress growth in 1960-89 for seventy-
seven OECD and developing countries as a cross-section on previous financial depth 
(M2/Y in 1960) in order to avoid endogeneity of the contemporary M2/Y variable. 
However, the statistical significance of their financial depth variable is almost entirely 
eliminated by highly significant regional dummies.
3 Moreover, when contemporary 
correlation between financial depth and growth is accounted for the predictive power of 
the model fails completely (Arestis & Panicos, 1997). This is not just a technical 
econometric issue. In fact, the widely used M2/Y is not a really reliable indicator of 
financial depth at all. It varies enormously over time as well as across countries, and 
responds to changing monetary policy stances and asset bubbles. Figure 1 applies 
theKing & Levine (1993a) measure of financial depth to the UK over the long run. While 
the increase in the measure during the 1980s does clearly reflect the major financial 
liberalization and modernization of that decade, did the UK really become less financially 
developed between 1950 and 1980, or during the early 1990s?  
 



































































Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics (various years).  
 
                                                 
2 Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) also correct some methodological problems in Levine and Zervos 
(1998). The latter analysis does not account for potential simultaneity bias nor does it control explicitly for 
country fixed effects. Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) use the Laporta and others (1998) measures of legal 
origin as instrumental variables to demonstrate causality. 
3 This point on regional differences in financial structure is taken up again below.  
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This problem is brought out even more starkly by the case of Mexico, where the 
M2/Y measure in fact shows relatively little variance over the long run despite major 
changes in Mexico’s financial system; while the short-run shifts are clearly related to 
shifts in monetary stance related to fiscal or external shocks. As in the case of the UK, 
therefore, cross-section studies including Mexico are liable to be misleading as the 
specific choice of base year will clearly affect the results substantially. Indeed, if we take 
this measure literally, Mexico had the same financial depth (a key measure of financial 
development as we have seen) as the UK in the mid-seventies!  
 




















  Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. (various years)  
 
A broader measure of financial assets than the M2 used in these cross-section 
studies should yield more reassuring results. Figure 3 shows the evolution of total 
financial claims on the private sector (as a proportion of GDP) for the UK over the past 
fifty years. The trend is certainly more stable, and the major step-change in the 1980s is 
more evident, yet there are also shorter-term movements which clearly reflect asset 
bubbles and shifting monetary policy stances.  
 






















Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics (various years)  
 
However, in the case of Mexico, this broader measure still exhibits considerable 
instability over the long run as Figure 4 shows. The increase of the early 1990s has been 
claimed as evidence of the positive effects of financial liberalization; but by the same 
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token the second half of that decade reflects the collapse of the asset bubble and thus the 
decade as a whole corresponds to a cycle of external capital flows, not financial 
development at all. Taking the whole five decades, by this measure there has been no 
financial deepening at all! 
 




















  Source: IMF International Financial Statistics (various years)  
 
It is important note that the different indicators of financial development that have 
a significant impact on growth reflect different characteristics of financial development. 
Bank credit to the private sector (as a proportion of GDP) ratio shown in Figure 4 is a 
better measure of the level of financial intermediation than the M2 /Y measure discussed 
above, but still has significant shortcomings that are revealed by time series but obscured 
by cross-section studies. Further, King & Zervos (1998)  and the other cognate studies 
mentioned above do not find any explanatory power in the ratio of stock market 
capitalization to GDP or in the size of stock markets relative to that of banks. Moreover, 
firm-level evidence shows that there are complementarities between banks and markets in 
developing countries (Demirgüç-Kunt & Maksimovic, 1996). An indicator of financial 
development that unfortunately has not been used in cross-country studies, probably 
because of lack of data availability in easily available multicountry databases  ( though 
readily available from central banks) is the duration of bank loans and fixed income 
securities, which would best correspond to the provision of investment finance.   
 
Part of the problem may be that these studies pool developed and developing 
countries: although the impact of financial development will differ depending on the 
stage of economic development of a country. The level of financial intermediation may 
be most important for economic growth at initial stages of development, while for richer 
countries, its efficiency and composition may be more relevant. The original study by 
King & Levine (1993a) and later ones by Andrés, Hernando & Lópes-Salido (1999) and 
Leahy & others (2001), are consistent with this view: they were unable to find significant 
links between bank credit to GDP ratios and subsequent economic growth rates in OECD 
countries; even though they do find a statistically significant relationship for developing 
countries. The reason for this result is evident from Figure 5: not only is there an 
enormous dispersion around the fitted linear trend, but also the logged relationship shows 
much less variation above a per capita income level of $10,000.  
   QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS153         Page 7 
 
Figure 5. Private Credit/GDP and GDP per capita, 2000 
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Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (2005). 
 
When we turn to the structure of finance, large differences are evident in Table 2. 
Both within the OECD and between developing regions in the level of financial market 
capitalization clearly differs widely, but these differences are not clearly related to 
economic development or efficiency.  
 
Table 2: Financial Depth Worldwide, 2003  
   Shares of GDP 
Stk Mkt  Debt Sec Bank ass Tot Cap 
Pub Priv Tot
World  0.86 0.56 0.88 1.44 1.12 3.42 
EMU*  0.60 0.67 0.97 1.64 1.60 3.84 
US  1.30 0.46 1.46 1.91 0.52 3.73 
Japan  1.14 1.43 0.53 1.96 1.45 4.54 
UK  1.37 0.29 1.05 1.34 2.22 4.93 
* of which 
Germany  0.45 0.48 1.20 1.68 1.20 3.33 
France  0.71 0.60 0.88 1.47 1.99 4.17 
Spain  0.86 0.53 0.74 1.27 1.09 3.22 
Portugal  0.42 0.72 0.81 1.53 1.18 3.14 
Greece  0.60 1.29 0.12 1.41 1.02 3.03 
EMs  0.47 0.23 0.15 0.37 0.78 1.63 
LA  0.76 0.21 0.24 0.45 1.12 2.33 
Asia  0.35 0.37 0.12 0.49 0.45 1.29 
ME  0.12 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.85 1.00 
Africa  0.30 0.13 0.05 0.18 0.60 1.08 





















Source: IMF Financial Stability Report( 2005)  
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In fact, corporate investment finance patterns differ due to evolution of ownership and 
regulation: they cannot be seen as a steady ‘progression’ towards a single US/UK model 
(Mayer, 1990). Banks remain the key element in the system, especially when we take into 
account the fact that they own most of the non-bank financial intermediaries. Pension and 
insurance funds emerge as major players in securitization very late in economic 
development. Further, a specific financial function can be carried out by different 
institutional forms any one country or region, which means that relative weight of 
statistical categories may vary widely while the real difference in terms of financial 
provision is small. A good example of this diversity is the institutional form of housing 
finance (mortgage provision): in the US this is provided by securitization under 
government guarantee; in the UK by building society and bank loans; in Germany by 
insurance companies; in Spain by savings and loans associations (cajas de ahorro); and 
in Mexico by construction companies.  
 
In consequence, financial structures are in fact very different across the world, as 
Table 3 demonstrates. It is not possible to claim that there is a unique relationship 
between a particular financial structure and either levels of income per capita. Indeed 
even though this table shows that banks remain central to the financial intermediation 
process in all countries other than the US – it obscures the fact that even in the US most  
of the non-bank financial intermediaries form part of bank holding groups. 
 
Table 3. Financial structure worldwide 
   As shares of total assets 
Stk Mkt Debt Sec Bank ass Tot Cap M
Pub Priv Tot
World  0.25 0.16 0.26 0.42 0.33 1.00 
EMU*  0.16 0.17 0.25 0.43 0.42 1.00 
US  0.35 0.12 0.39 0.51 0.14 1.00 
Japan  0.25 0.31 0.12 0.43 0.32 1.00 
UK  0.28 0.06 0.21 0.27 0.45 1.00 
* of which 
Germany  0.13 0.15 0.36 0.50 0.36 1.00 
France  0.17 0.14 0.21 0.35 0.48 1.00 
Spain  0.27 0.16 0.23 0.39 0.34 1.00 
Portugal  0.13 0.23 0.26 0.49 0.38 1.00 
Greece  0.20 0.43 0.04 0.47 0.34 1.00 
EMs  0.29 0.14 0.09 0.23 0.48 1.00 
LA  0.33 0.09 0.10 0.19 0.48 1.00 
Asia  0.27 0.28 0.10 0.38 0.35 1.00 
ME  0.12 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.85 1.00 
Africa  0.28 0.12 0.04 0.16 0.56 1.00 





















Source: IMF Financial Stability Report (2005)   
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Financial Liberalization, Savings and Corporate Funding  
The proponents of financial liberalization as leading to financial development in 
developing countries have emphasized two main channels through which private 
investment is expected to rise. The first channel is through an increase in the availability 
of credit that would follow the removal of interest rate ceiling due to increased private 
saving; and the second is through the enhanced screening of investment projects due to 
the higher cost of capital, thereby increasing the marginal productivity of investment 
(McKinnon, 1973). Second, ending financial repression would  improve bank efficiency 
by ensuring positive real interest rates, eliminating excessive reserve requirements and 
removing mandated credit allocations (McKinnon, 1989). Extensions of the basic 
hypothesis focussed on investment levels (Kapur, 1976; Mathieson, 1980) and quality 
(Galbis, 1977; Fry, 1988) as lending shifts from informal ‘curb’ markets into the banking 
system.  
 
Early critics of this model such as van Wijnbergen (1983) or Taylor (1983) are 
sceptical that increased financial intermediation will result from liberalization, because 
curb markets that are not subject to the reserve requirement that apply to banks. Hence, if 
substitution takes place between bank time deposits and curb markets, the total supply of 
funds available to the business sector will decline. Moreover, if banks then lend to the 
public sector (e.g. by investing in Treasury bills), the diversion of funds away from the 
curb market will result in a net decline in the availability of private sector credit. Due to 
limited access of the small and medium firms to bank credit, a shift of fund from curb 
market to the banking system reduces the availability of credit for these types of firms 
unless liberalization of banking system reduces bias against small borrower. 
 
Moreover, in most developing countries where both market and non-market 
imperfections exist within broader liberalized macroeconomic framework, there is host of 
factors other than the volume and cost of credit that influence firms’ investment 
decisions. For instance, evidence from four African countries (Uganda, Kenya, Malawi 
and Lesotho) does not support the hypothesis that increase in financial depth increases the 
volume of savings or access to credit of the commercial banks in rural areas, except for 
those who already have collateral (Mosley, 1999). Conventional financial institutions are 
biased against small borrowers due to the high unit costs of loan administration and lack 
of effective collateral, which translate into low returns and high risk. This is a major 
problem for all developing countries as small firms account for the bulk of production 
and the great majority of employment. This ‘gap’ has traditionally been addressed by 
public sector development banks and extension schemes; but these have generally been 
dismantled as part of financial reforms, and not effectively replaced by micro-credit 
schemes, which are systemically limited in their coverage and scope.  
 
There is a general agreement that financial liberalization has led to greater 
allocative efficiency if this is defined as the commercial profitability of banks, but the 
predicted boost in saving as predicted by McKinnon and Shaw has not been observed 
(Williamson & Mahar, 1998). Studies by the World Bank (1989), Fry (1997), Ghani 
(1992) and King and Levine (1993b) did reveal positive and significant cross-section 
relationships between economic growth and real interest rate. However, Fry (1997) 
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observed an inverted U shaped relation between national savings and real interest rates in 
his study on 16 developing countries: national savings decline at both very high and low 
real interest rates through the effects of these rates on output growth.
4 For Argentina no 
strong relationship between real interest rate and quantity of investment was reported 
although an increase in financial deepening was observed (Fanelli, Rozenwurcel and 
Simpson, 1998). Nevertheless, a positive effect on investment efficiency for Uruguay is 
reported by Noya, Casacuberta and Lorenzo (1998).  
 
Again, the Mexican experience shows little evidence that movement in real 
interest rates significantly affected economic performance. While financial saving is 
positively correlated with real interest rates, total domestic saving appears to be unrelated 
to the rate of interest, which may imply some substitution of domestic non-financial 
assets into domestic financial savings (Warman & Thirlwall, 1994). The net effect of 
interest rates on Mexican investment is thus negative. Gunçavdi, Bleaney and McKay 
(1998) observed structural change in the aggregate investment equation after financial 
liberalization in Turkey: as expected, the credit variable became much less important 
although cost of capital did not become significant.  
 
In sum, there is little evidence that financial liberalization has in fact resulted in 
higher savings rates, which was supposed to be the main contribution to higher 
investment and thus growth, even though it has resulted in increased bank profitability. 
There are two reasons for this outcome. First, financial reform has the effect of shifting 
savings out of assets such as precious metals, property or currency into bank deposits and 
marketable securities. This will raise the recorded financial ‘depth’ without raising 
savings rates. Second, financial liberalization expands access to consumer credit in the 
form of factoring systems, credit cards and personal loans. These in turn reduce aggregate 
household saving because this is simply the difference between the increase in household 
financial assets and the increase in household financial liabilities. In many emerging 
markets, this net wealth effect has been compounded by simultaneous trade liberalization 
and real exchange rate liberalization which cheapened imported luxury goods (Calderon 
& FitzGerald, 1997).  
 
In consequence, as Figure 6 illustrates, there is no robust evidence that financial 
deepening (measured by the widest possible measure – total market capitalization) is 
related to higher rates of saving and thus investment or growth for the developed 
countries. There is some link for developing countries but as we have seen, the causality 
is more likely to run the other way: from high savings rates to high capitalisation. In fact, 
savings rates themselves appear to depend on other factors such as demographic and tax 
influences on pension provision, funding of health and education, and the ownership 
structure of corporations or even family organization. 
 
                                                 
4 Indeed, even at the theoretical level, the net effect of interest rates on saving is ambiguous because the 
wealth effect and the relative price effect have negative and positive effects respectively. See FitzGerald 
(2006). 
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Figure 6. Financial market capitalization and savings rates (shares of GDP), 2003 
 
Source: IMF Financial Stability Report (2005).  
Note: ‘Financial market capitalization’ refers to the sum of stock market capitalization, outstanding debt 
securities and bank assets as a share of GDP. The ‘savings rate’ refers to gross national savings as a 
percentage of GDP.  
 
 
Of course, the effect of financial development and liberalization on investment 
might still be positive even though it does not raise savings, through the quality of 
investment improving due to the monitoring and discipline exercised by financial 
markets, even if absolute investment levels do not rise. Rajan & Zingales (1998) thus 
attempt to establish whether industrial sectors that are relatively more in need of external 
finance
5 develop disproportionately faster in countries with more-developed financial 
markets. They use the ratio of credit to (claims on) the private sector to GDP as the 
financial depth indicator; but add an indicator of compliance with international 
accounting standards to reflect the quality of that finance. They get significant results 
from a panel of 55 countries over 1980-1990, indicating that financial development does 
have a positive effect on growth through the corporate finance channel. However, there 
are serious shortcoming in this method: first, the unreliability of the financial depth 
indicator, as we have noted above; and second, the degree of financial dependence used 
                                                 
5 The financial dependence of each industrial sector is assumed to be the same as that for the US in all 
countries. This assumption begs the central question to be investigated and undoubtedly undermines the 
reliability of the results. 
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for all countries is that for the US in the corresponding industrial sector
6; and third, the 
index of compliance with international accounting standards used to instrument for 
‘quality of financial institutions’ appears to be meaningless.
7  
 
The solution to this puzzle may be to look at corporate finance in more detail in 
order to establish the link between financial development and firms’ investment. 
However, as is well known, corporate investment even in advanced economies is largely 
self-financed out of retained profits. The analysis of net sources of finance for physical 
investment in Germany, Japan, the UK and the US reveal not only the predominance of 
retained profits to be higher in the UK and the US despite their more developed financial 
markets, but the key role of banks in all cases among external sources (Corbett & 
Jenkinson, 1997). Only in the case of the US are bonds a significant source of corporate 
investment finance, and even here it should be recalled that a considerable share of these 
bonds are held by banks. We should not be surprised, therefore, to find that financial 
liberalization has liitle observable effect on aggregate investment levels or economic 
growth.   
 
Table 5. Net sources of finance, 1970-1994 (% of physical investment) 
 Germany  Japan  UK  US 
Internal   78.9  69.9  93.3  96.1 
Bank finance  11.9  26.7  14.6  11.1 
Bonds -1.0  4.0  4.2  15.4 
New equity  0.1  3.5  -4.6  -7.6 
Trade credit  -1.2  -5.0  -0.9  -2.4 
Capital transfers  8.7  --  1.7  -- 
Other 1.4  1.0  0.0  -4.4 
Statistical adjustment  1.2  0.0  -8.4  -8.3 
Source: Corbett & Jenkinson, 1997. 
 
None the less great expectations were raised by of stock markets as a new source 
of corporate finance in developing countries in the early 1990s. In retrospect is is clear 
that this boom was closely associated with capital inflows, producing an apparent 
correlation with economic growth (e.g. Levine & Zervos 1998). These markets have since 
shrunk dramatically, and turn out to have low liquidity (i.e. turnover) with volatile and 
pro-cyclical returns. Further, after the initial flotation of state enterprises, new issues have 
declined markedly because large domestic firms can access global capital markets and the 




                                                 
6 That is, they assume that the value of the external financing ratio for a specific industrial branch in the US 
can be applied automatically to the same branch in (say) India. No justification is given for this major 
assumption, which largely begs the question that the article sets out to answer.  
7 Specifically, Rajan & Zingales (1998) give the following index values for accounting standards 
(implicitly set for US = 100) among others: Austria (54), Mexico (60), Germany (62), Netherlands (64), 
Philippines (65), New Zealand (70), Malaysia (76), UK (78). It is difficult to understand how research of 
this calibre is acceptable to leading journals and their referees.   
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Financial Liberalization, Investment and Instability  
The success of resource allocation efficiency depends, to a great extent, on minimizing 
emerging capital market imperfections such as moral hazard and adverse selection 
(Watson, 1993). Stiglitz & Weiss (1981) showed that an equilibrium loan market rate is 
characterized by credit rationing; and Mankiw (1986) that there may not exist any 
equilibrium at all (i.e. a ‘collapsed market’ with no lending). Asymmetric informational 
problems prevent banks from adequately measuring the risk associated with their lending: 
to compensate for this risk banks push their lending rates up leading to deterioration of 
the creditworthiness of borrowers. Banks thus penalise safe borrowers with a high cost of 
capital, while new firms with no past credit record (and/or little collateral) find funding 
difficult to obtain at any price. Capital markets, with high entry costs and information 
requirements, are even more exclusive – unless a financial intermediary can bundle 
securities such as credit card debt or mortgages effectively by using the homogeneity of 
clients to provide useful default risk indicators. 
 
Financial market failure in the provision of longterm credit to large sections of the 
private sector in developing countries thus constrains the level of investment to that 
fundable by cash flow and trade credit; resulting in a sub-optimal level of investment 
with consequences for economic growth. Further, the higher cost of capital induces the 
borrower to choose riskier projects, with higher probability of default. Hence, the market 
equilibrium, if any, will be fragile. Small changes in the exogenous risk free interest rate 
or a monetary contraction can have a large impact on the efficiency of the market 
allocation of credit. In such a situation, government intervention (in the form of a tax 
subsidy or a loan guarantee) can improve the situation even if the government has no 
informational advantage over lenders characterized by unobservable heterogeneity, as 
long as return exceeds opportunity cost. Market failure in a liberalized financial regime 
may thus call for selective public intervention.  
 
Macroeconomic instability increases the variance in project returns and also 
adverse selection possibility by the banks, thus making banks risk averse. The real benefit 
of macroeconomic stability thus comes not from increased financial savings and greater 
availability of credit, but from the favourable impact on risk-sharing relationship between 
borrowers and lenders (Villanueva & Mirakhor, 1990). The pace of liberalization itself is 
thus crucial in the sense that sudden increase in lending rate resulting from freeing of 
interest rate may render some firms unprofitable as they need to pay a higher price for 
their funds borrowed earlier at a lower rate. This will in turn result in non-repayment of 
loans. Mathieson (1980) warned that as this leads to widespread bankruptcies in the 
banking system, a programme of gradual interest rate decontrol is necessary rather than 
sudden decontrol. Moreover, such decontrol should not be attempted until a sufficient 
degree of fiscal and macroeconomic stability has been achieved – financial liberalization 
has not been effective as a means of achieving stability in itself. 
 
Theoretically, there are potential gains from deregulation of financial institutions 
in the form of increasing growth and social welfare. But much of these depend on proper 
sequencing and if poorly sequenced, deregulation can be counterproductive. The 
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literature on sequencing of financial liberalization seeks to determine the optimal order 
for liberalizing the domestic real sector, the domestic financial sector, the external real 
sector and the external financial sector. It is generally agreed that domestic financial 
liberalization should come after domestic real and before external financial sector 
liberalization. However, it is not at all clear whether domestic financial liberalization 
should come before or after external liberalization, e.g. trade liberalization (Gibson & 
Tsakalotos, 1994). Institutional factors such as the legal infrastructure, bankruptcy code, 
accounting norms, disclosure rules and prudential regulations, are all important for 
fostering the operation of financial markets and capturing any ensuing efficiency gains, 
and are central elements in successful financial liberalization (Aivazian, 1998).  
 
Finally, Sikorski (1996) points out that financial liberalization theory was 
predicated on an unashamed faith in the markets and the widespread belief that 
‘government failure’ was best combated by removing the government. But this belief 
conflicts with what actually happens in any real economy where social institutions play a 
crucial role in gathering information and reducing uncertainty (Gibson & Tsakalotos, 
1994). Thus, deliberate institutional design is essential in order to develop the long-term, 
high trust relations between market participants that determine how well a country can 
compete in international markets and hence in the long run its economic performance. 
For instance, since information collected through monitoring the financial institutions 
regarding their solvency and management practices by individuals is costly and becomes 
a public good, it would be sub-optimal in welfare terms for depositors to monitor them 
individually (Fry, 1997). As financial institutions know that depositors do not adequately 
monitor them, they have incentives to take greater risks. However, as long as central bank 
plays its due role of supervision and monitoring and makes the information public this 
cost should be minimized.  
 
Nevertheless, non-existence of markets does not necessarily imply that public 
intervention would result in superior outcome. Public intervention as substitute for 
market failure can suffer from exactly the same problems of unobservable outcomes (e.g. 
contractual default), unobservable behaviour (e.g. moral hazard) or unobservable 
characteristics (e.g. adverse selection) as the private sector (Obstfeld & Rogoff, 1996). 
There can exist other markets dealing with the problem (e.g. higher equity participation to 
tackle uncertainty problems, specialized institutions/banks for industrial credit, leasing 
companies). So the pertinent question is why those contingent-markets are absent and, in 
the case of smaller developing countries, whether these services can be provided by the 
international capital market.  
 
The greatest problem for developing countries in this context is probably the 
absence of a domestic market for long-term domestic market for treasury or corporate 
bonds. This means that it is difficult to fund public infrastructure investment and major 
private modernization projects on the one hand. On the other hand, it becomes impossible 
for firms to hedge against exchange rate changes, further destabilizing foreign currency 
markets; and monetary intervention in order to counteract external shocks becomes very 
difficult. Financial liberalization has not led to this important outcome, for at least two 
reasons. First, fiscal reform has been geared to reducing budget deficits, and to avoiding 
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monetization (i.e. inflation targeting) by issuance of short-term T-bills, rather than 
developing a long bond market. Second, the absence of institutional market makers in 
these securities persists if no special facilities (such as rediscount facilities or tax 
incentives) are extended to pension and insurance funds to encourage demand for these 
assets.  
 
With the deregulation of interest rates, banks gamble for higher profit by lending 
to the booming sector, such as real estate. This leads to asset price boom that “can 
exacerbate the adverse incentive on banks to take risk, increased interest rates, increased 
macroeconomic instability and, if bank’s portfolios are concentrated on particular sectors, 
increased covariance in the returns to banks’ borrowers” (Brownbridge & Kirkpatrick, 
1999). The booms and slumps in the asset prices – where banks play a crucial role by 
credit expansion during upswing in the business cycle and thus raising value of collateral, 
stimulating more borrowing, leading to over indebtedness and making borrowers 
vulnerable to any macroeconomic changes (e.g. interest rate increases) and ultimately 
rendering them insolvent – frequently result in banking crises. Moreover, personnel in the 
banking sector in the developing countries often lack the skill required for evaluating 
risky investment projects and monitoring the borrowers. Indeed the liberalized 
environment itself causes a moral hazard problem and induces the banks to take on risks.  
 
Financial liberalization is usually associated with integration to global capital 
market. In principle, this should make an international pool of liquidity available to the 
domestic financial system, which should then be more stable. However, in practice, the 
high degree of volatility of international capital inflows combined with the narrow and 
thin nature of host markets subjects the recipient countries to shocks and crisis, which can 
be both large and frequent. The quantity effect of the flows is exacerbated by the fact that 
arbitrage leas to the domestic interest rate being set by the world interest rate, plus 
expected devaluation plus the perceived default risk premium. This uncovered interest 
rate parity principle leads to very high real rates of interest in emerging markets and 
asymmetric responses in terms of investment and output due to the impact on firms’ 
balance sheets; the volatility of expected profits resulting from this has a strong 
depressive effect on private investment (FitzGerald 2001). The orthodox policy response 
to these crises can further worsen the situation as firms are forced into bankruptcy by 
credit restrictions and large devaluations with asymmetric effects on balance sheets.  
 
Domestic investment financed by foreign savings leads to a temporary increase in 
real income and perceived wealth and relaxation of lending standard by banks as current 
trends are expected to continue (Reisen, 1999). With the increase in both consumption 
and investment balance of payment deteriorates which remains unnoticed at initial stage. 
Overvaluation of the exchange rate can sustain this sense of optimism – and thus 
exacerbate the asset bubble. Hence, for most of the developing countries the question of 
exchange rate policy is also crucial to the success of financial liberalization. Indeed, from 
the point of view of firms faced by irreversible investment decisions, macroeconomic 
stability and credit availability are more important than low interest rates or tax incentives 
(Pindyck & Solimano, 1993). 
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In sum, the process, rather than the objectives of financial liberalization in 
developing countries has emerged as the central problem. The original ‘big bang’ 
approach is clearly dangerous; but Clarke (1996) suggests that even the concept of an 
‘equilibrium’ interest rate may be undefined or at least unobtainable through the process 
of competition since the rate required to balance financial markets differs from that 
required to equilibrate savings and investment. Specifically, Stiglitz & others (2006) 
argue that a delay in capital market liberalization, despite a degree of continued financial 
repression, can be beneficial in developing countries. Further, an increase in repression 
(or control) in some areas of financial markets may be essential in order to ensure that the 






Conclusions: Policy Lessons and Epistemic Implications 
The main conclusions of this chapter are four. First, that financial depth ratios fluctuate 
widely over time for individual countries, while financial structures differ considerably 
between industrialised economies: so neither are a reliable guide to desirable financial 
development in industrialising countries.  Second, that despite the assurances in the 
canonical literature there is no simple relationship between financial development in 
terms of both depth (increased asset/income ratio) and structure (increased non-bank asset 
share) and economic growth, particularly in developing countries. Third, that financial 
liberalisation cannot be demonstrated to raise overall savings or investment rates, or to 
increase corporate efficiency; although it does ensure bank solvency, albeit at the expense 
of small firms and long-term investment lending.  And fourth, that too rapid a pace of 
financial reform and opening to global capital markets can create considerable instability 
despite efficiency gains, leading to a net reduction of investment and growth.    
 
Two further questions logically arise from these conclusions. What are their implications 
for the design future financial reform strategies in developing countries? And why does 
the orthodox model persist in the face of the evidence? I can do no more than sketch a 
response to these two questions here.  
 
On the policy issues, a useful initial step would be to reappraise the role of commercial 
banks in developing countries, the traditional intermediaries between saving households 
and investing firms. Their move into asset management and consumer credit, and away 
from the financing of productive investment in general and SMEs in particular, has been 
encouraged by regulators concerned for bank liquidity. Similarly, the closure of public 
sector development banks was justified by their heavy losses and vulnerability to political 
pressure, but the financing gap for long-term investment in key sectors such as exports 
and infrastructure remains. Public intervention is still needed to correct this market failure 
– although this could take the form of risk insurance, rediscount facilities, support for 
debt securitization and market making, rather than traditional development banking. By 
extension, the relaxation of regulatory restrictions should avoid asset booms and systemic 
risk, rather than aim for banking efficiency alone.  
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Further, monetary policy should encompass exchange rates and be geared towards 
providing a credible and stable environment for firms rather than simply inflation 
targeting: specifically by providing a low real interest rate and a competitive real 
exchange rate, supported by appropriate tax incentives for long term productive 
investment. The development of a long term bond market should be a priority, as this 
would not only provide long-term capital for growth at reasonable real cost but also 
stabilize exchange rate expectations and enable the monetary authorities to intervene 
effectively to damp macroeconomic cycles caused by external shocks – as has been the 
case in OECD countries until recently.   
 
On the epistemic issue of the persistence of a flawed paradigm of financial development 
in the face of the evidence, there are two obvious yet unsatisfactory answers. On the one 
hand, some would say that the previous model had simply failed, so that financial 
liberalisation was the only option available. In consequence the existence of a coherent 
analytical and empirical justification is irrelevant, or at best a post hoc rationalisation.  
 
One the other hand, others would say that financial liberalisation simply reflects the 
interests of international banks, who form alliances with relevant fractions of domestic 
finance capital and determine the policies of international financial institutions. The 
orthodox model is then little more than propaganda, however sophisticated, or at best a 
case of interested parties taking advantage of misguided theorists.   
  
A more insightful approach might be that of theorists of the diffusion of economic ideas, 
who identify three drivers of change in economic policy adoption.
8  These are: first, the 
role of internal political actors (including not only politicians and academics but also 
finance and banking officials) to whom decision-makers listen; second, external pressures 
from the international community, both market actors such as banks and governments 
with strategic interests; and third and possibly most importantly, the influence of  
‘epistemic communities’, or key intellectual elites within a particular discipline, in this 
case not only economics but also finance and management. The epistemic community not 
only influences policy makers directly by presenting dominant ideas as the only valid 
ones, but also has a deep influence on local and international officials (e.g. in the World 
Bank and IMF) through their training at leading universities in the US and, to a lesser 
extent in the UK.  
 
The epistemic community does not rely upon economics journals to provide the latest 
research results or analytical models. These are far more quickly available through policy 
conferences, consultancy missions and even academic working papers. Rather academic 
journals, and to a lesser extent academic book publishers, act as arbiters of what is 
considered sound research. In the case of the literature on the effect of financial 
development on economic growth, and the benefits of specific institutional forms in 
particular at least, it seems that the profession has failed in its proper duty.  
                                                 
8 This paragraph is based on the editors’ introduction to FitzGerald and Thorp 2005 
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